Математическо моделиране на долния крайник и колянната става
Debates on the applicability of semi-presidentialism in Türkiye frequently treat governmental systems as fixed and mutually exclusive models. This article instead evaluates semi-presidentialism as a variable institutional arrangement whose consequences depend on the distribution of authority, the location of political responsibility, and the procedures used to manage disagreement within the executive. It asks under which constitutional conditions a semi-presidential design could operate coherently in Türkiye. The study uses a structured qualitative comparison of France, Portugal, Finland, Romania, and Russia, alongside an institutional analysis of Türkiye's constitutional development and current governmental framework. The comparison distinguishes premier-presidential systems, in which the cabinet is responsible only to parliament, from president-parliamentary systems, in which both the president and parliament may terminate the cabinet's tenure. The findings indicate that applicability cannot be inferred from the direct election of a president alone. A workable design would require a premier-presidential responsibility rule, an explicit allocation of presidential and governmental competences, transparent countersignature and joint-decision procedures, effective parliamentary lawmaking and budgetary capacity, carefully limited election-renewal mechanisms, and independent constitutional adjudication. Türkiye's experience with direct presidential election, nationwide executive legitimacy, parliamentary institutions, and constitutional review provides relevant institutional resources. Nevertheless, these resources would need to be reorganized around an unambiguous chain of democratic accountability. The article concludes that semi-presidentialism is conditionally applicable in Türkiye, but only as a carefully specified constitutional design rather than as a general compromise between presidential and parliamentary government
Ключови думи: semi-presidentialism, Türkiye, dual executive, parliamentary accountability, constitutional design, comparative politics